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Lauterpacht's duty of recognition, which, as Pat-
rick Capps has pointed out, was Laucerpacht's
great attempt to create a stable and predictable
structure for this most political of international
law problems.3 Even if Fabry disagrees with this
position, some attempt should have been made to
engage with the argument. As is, it looks like the
reification of political judgment and state-centred
positivism, of which Lauterpacht was famously
critical.' What is more, the constitutive frame is
underdeveloped; Fabry simply refers to the Anglo-
American model of de facto statehood as it
appeared in the early nineteenth century without
any attempt to update the concept in light of mod-
ern notions of independence and self-sufficiency,
about which international law has much to say.
JAMES CRAWFORD
Lauterpacht Centrefor International Law
University of Cambridge
Selecting International Judges: Principle, Process,
and Politics. By Ruth Mackenzie, Kate Mal-
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Books about apparently fundamental concepts
likejudges and courts in the international legal sys-
tem are prone to fall victim to what Harold D.
Lasswell, former president of the American Soci-
ety of International Law, and Abraham Kaplan
called "index instability."
The chemist using the term "carbon" knows
that his spectroscope will record certain wave
bands whether he uses the instrument in
New England or Mexico. But the social sci-
entist studying anger cannot specify for it a
simple index applicable in both places. Not
only are the patterns on the basis of which
anger is inferable different in the two cul-
tures; there are also variations among income
groups and other social stratifications. More-
Patrick Capps, Lauterpacht' Method, 2012 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. (forthcoming).
4 MARrTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVI-
LIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1870-1960), at 363 (2002).
over, the indices may acquire different signif-
icance with time ... .
Lasswell and Kaplan cautioned that this "index
instability" contributes "significantly to the futil-
ity in the present state of research of many
attempts at metricizing (quantifying) political
hypotheses."2 One cannot but be struck by the
problem of index instability, especially for terms
like judges and courts in domestic and international
settings, in reading this refreshingly ambitious and
idealistic book about the selection ofjudges for the
International Court ofJustice (ICJ) and the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC). Certainly, the
United Nations is not comparable to a national
government so it would be surprising were the
United Nations' "principal judicial organ" (p. 18)
to function just like a national court and its judges
like their national counterparts. Why then should
we be surprised that the ideal-and sometimes
idealized-judicial selection practices of a well-
run-and sometimes idealized-democratic sys-
tem are not replicated in international judicial
selection?
That is not to say, however, that even if inter-
national judges perform different functions and
even if distinctly different international selection
procedures for judges might be justified that they
are necessarily working satisfactorily. Part of the
selection process is reportedly not working to
secure enough qualified candidates to fill the
vacancies on at least one of those courts on which
Selecting International Judges focuses. Last Sep-
tember, the Financial Times reported:
The International Criminal Court is strug-
gling to find enough candidates to take up
positions as judges.
The news casts doubt on how the world's
highest criminal court is run as it prepares for
cases against ousted dictators such as Colonel
Muammer Gaddafi.
A lack of candidates made the court extend a
nomination deadline for six new judges by
two weeks until this Friday and could still
force another extension, said court officials.
'HAROLD D. LASSWELL & ABRAHAM KAPLAN,
POWER AND SOCIETY: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITI-
CAL INQUIRY, at xx (1950).
2 Id. at xx-xxi.
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But that delay has come amid bigger ques-
tions about the competence of the court's
judges, their pay and how they conduct their
work.3
The Financial Times went on to observe delicately:
Nobody has yet raised questions about the
quality of the current candidates. But previ-
ous polls have been criticised for being too
political and including candidates with
insufficient qualifications. Japan, which con-
tributed a fifth of this year's annual budget of
E1 03.6m ($142.7m), previously successfully
nominated two judges who were not quali-
fied lawyers.4
SelectingInternationaljudges addresses this issue
more directly. The authors are Ruth Mackenzie,
the deputy director of the Centre for International
Courts and Tribunals at University College Lon-
don (CICT); Kate Malleson, a professor of law at
Queen Mary, University of London; Penny Mar-
tin, a research fellow at the CICT; and Philippe
Sands, a professor of law and the director of the
CICT. Few readers of Selecting International
Judges will be surprised by the political process by
which judges for these international institutions
are selected. Nor will the readers be surprised that
the authors are unhappy about the selection pro-
cesses and, by implication given the authors' rec-
ommendations, that they are unhappy with the
quality of some of the judges who are selected.
Apparently, the elite levels of government that
over time have designed these processes and make
those selections seem to be content with the way
the process is working, a point that might have
been worth exploring.
In analyzing the processes by which judges are
nominated and elected to international courts,
Selecting International Judges focuses on the ICJ
and the ICC, describing the factors that influence
whether a state nominates a candidate to the inter-
national court; the procedures by which candi-
dates for the international tribunals are identified
and vetted at the national level and then at the
' Caroline Binham, The Hague Struggles to Find




international level; the considerations that influ-
ence a candidate's success or failure at the interna-
tional level; and the respective roles of merit, pol-
itics, and other features in the nomination and
election ofjudges to these courts. The authors con-
clude that although a great deal ofvariability exists
in the judicial nomination and election processes,
political considerations often detract from the
selection as international court judges of those
whom they deem to be the most highly qualified
candidates. These political considerations may
include whether a candidate's country delegation
in New York was able to lobby support among
other UN delegations or whether a country was
able to trade votes in other contexts in return for
votes for a particular judicial candidate. The book
suggests some reforms that the authors believe can
promote transparency and accountability in
national and international selection procedures.
The book's individual chapters provide valu-
able details about the courts and the selection pro-
cesses used for each court. The first chapter traces
the key stages in the discussions regarding the pro-
visions for the selection process for judges in the
negotiations of the ICJ and ICC statutes. While
state participants at the Rome Conference for the
ICC comprehensively debated the appointment
procedure for judges-which resulted in the cre-
ation of detailed provisions in the Rome Statute
governing this process-those drafting the stat-
utes of the ICJ and its predecessor the Permanent
Court of International Justice did not go into sim-
ilar depth in creating procedures for judicial selec-
tion.5
The second chapter describes the composition
of the ICJ and ICC, including the rules that gov-
ern the appointment of judges. Irrespective of
these rules, the authors emphasize that the most
important factors in national nominations and
international judicial elections are geography and
member states' desire to secure nominees who will
favorably represent a given state's interest. (One is
reminded of Wiley Rutledge questioning Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt as to why he had been
'MANLEY 0. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE
QUESTION OF AMERICAN PARTICIPATION 8-9
(1925).
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selected for the Supreme Court. "Wiley," the pres-
ident said, "you have geography."') The authors
also point out, however, that some secondary fac-
tors may play a role in nominations and elections,
including domestic and international legal knowl-
edge, political and negotiating experience, and
academic expertise.
The third chapter carefully examines the
national-level nomination processes for the ICJ
and ICC judges. Despite differences in rules, sim-
ilarities exist in nominations to these two interna-
tional tribunals. Most countries have panels over-
seeing the process, which are either national
groups from the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA) or ad hoc groups created exclusively for the
nomination process. Countries have adopted var-
ious procedures governing the national groups,
with the level of formalization of rules inversely
related to the extent to which the nominating
group is supposed to be independent and transpar-
ent and is supposed to use merit-based criteria.
Even in the most independent national panels,
however, the authors state that the selection of
nominees by states is often based on political cal-
culations, including the state's interest in having a
judge ofits nationality; the acceptability ofputting
forward a candidate at the domestic political level
and the availability ofsufficient resources to run an
election campaign; the likelihood of success at the
international level; and the political capital con-
siderations related to other international cam-
paigns that the state plans to undertake.
The fourth chapter turns to the international
election of judges after countries nominate candi-
dates. The authors argue that, because various
political factors influence the selection of judges,
merit plays a secondary role in the election process.
The authors describe the intense negotiations,
campaigning, and vote trading that precede inter-
national judicial elections in the United Nations
or in meetings of the Assembly of States Parties to
the ICC; the international election of judges is
similar to the process that occurs in elections for
other international posts. Candidates and their
6 HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS,
AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME
COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO
BUSH II, at 186 (5th ed. 2008).
state parties campaign vigorously, with campaign-
ing occurring in capitals, at embassies, and in New
York. In addition, regional groups, such as those in
Africa or the Latin American and Caribbean
Group (GRULAC), may play a significant role in
endorsing or opposing candidates, and vote trad-
ing may be common among state parties.
The fifth chapter is prescriptive, summarizing
recent trends in improving judicial selection pro-
cesses to international tribunals and describing
policy measures that may be taken. The authors
note the strong rhetorical support in the interna-
tional community-or, at least, in that portion
that responded to their inquiries-to improve
transparency in judicial selection, with some
efforts to encourage states to explain their reasons
for nominating certain judges and to consult with
knowledgeable individuals and institutions prior
to making nominations. The authors recommend
reforming nomination and election procedures so
that merit plays a greater role in judicial selection.
Yet the authors also endorse the need for promot-
ing linguistic, gender, regional, and cultural diver-
sity among international judges, criteria that may
come at the cost of the very merit considerations
that they endorse. In this vein, the authors laud the
ICC system, which allocates a minimum number
of seats to each of the five UN regional groups and
eighteen "floating" seats, which can be won by any
of the regional groups. The authors seem oblivi-
ous, however, to the actual quality problems noted
above that the ICC is reportedly experiencing.
While many of the authors' conclusions seem
entirely plausible, the social science methodology
that they deploy is less rigorous than it appears.
The authors used a three-step research methodol-
ogy to describe empirically the selection process
for the ICJ and ICC. In pursuing this methodol-
ogy, they relied on the guidance of an advisory
committee composed of experts chaired by Lord
Henry Woolf, former lord chiefjustice of England
and Wales. First, the authors distributed a ques-
tionnaire comprised of twenty-three multiple-
choice and free-text questions to members of the
delegations of the Permanent Missions to the
United Nations, academics, national groups in the
PCA, legal advisers from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Ministry of justice, and contacts from
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the Fifth Session of the Assembly of States Parties
to the Rome Statute. This questionnaire
attempted to establish what is known as a "snow-
ball" sample of interviewees-a nonprobability
sampling technique in which existing interviewees
recruit more interview subjects from among their
colleagues and acquaintances-who could com-
ment on the national nomination processes for
ICJ and ICC judges (p. 181). The authors ulti-
mately received forty-six responses, spread over
different groups. To preserve anonymity, the
respondents were neither identified nor were their
positions and niches in the judicial selection pro-
cess revealed.
Second, to gain a greater sense of the lobbying
and election procedures used to promote judicial
nominees at the international level, the authors
sent interview invitations to 182 delegations and
staff members from the Permanent Missions of
countries in New York and conducted detailed
interviews with 19 from 17 countries and a num-
ber of United Nations staff members. The inter-
viewees ranged from permanent representatives to
third secretaries and also included the legal advis-
ers and the election offices for those missions that
have these posts. The interviews themselves were
open-ended, focusing on discussions of the cam-
paign and election efforts for nominees to interna-
tional courts. Third, to shed light on the national
process of judicial nominations, after looking at
preliminary research and consulting with the advi-
sory committee, the authors selected 9 countries
that had nominated judges. The authors then sent
invitation letters to a range of representatives from
these countries and interviewed those who
responded and others to whom the respondents
referred the authors.
Several methodological problems arise with
their ambitious social-scientific effort. The
authors' discussion of research methodology is
located at the end of the book in an appendix,
seemingly as an afterthought, rather than as the
first chapter. This placement has the effect of
obscuring some of the less scientific methodolo-
gies actually involved. In addition, as previously
noted, Selecting InternationalJudges makes use of
the snowball technique described above. Although
this technique may have been necessary to secure
additional interviewees, it detracts from the gener-
alizability of the book's conclusions and recom-
mendations. The authors cannot ultimately deter-
mine to what extent the sample populations
consulted can testify to the actual practice in selec-
tion procedures to international courts and, even
more damaging to their thesis, to the views held by
the actual decision makers with respect to the
acceptability of current practices.' The study
methodology used in the book also confronts non-
response bias, which compounds some of the chal-
lenges posed by the use of nonprobability sam-
pling. At different stages of the process, the
authors communicated with potential interview-
ees and interviewed only those who responded
affirmatively to interview requests. Those who
responded may represent only a subset of the study
population that does not speak for a larger major-
ity that may have been unable or unwilling to
express their opinions or may have held very dif-
ferent views.
More troubling than their methodology is the
authors' willingness to imply dissatisfaction with
the current selection process, yet their reluctance
to expressly delineate a set of substantive criteria
that ought to guide the decision. Their process-
based focus leaves the reader at a loss in conceptu-
alizing the central problem that the book postu-
lates and seeks to address: the assumption that the
most highly qualified candidates-whatever the
criteria may be for determining that factor-are
not being chosen as candidates for these interna-
tional courts. If the attentive reader pieces together
different threads of the analysis, the authors
emphasize a broader universe ofqualities necessary
for international courts, including judges' foreign-
language abilities, region-specific competence,
diverse legal-system proficiency,9 trial procedure
knowledge, domestic-level trial experience, and
international law expertise. Are these qualities
7 See, e.g., ZINA O'LEARY, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE
TO DOING RESEARCH 109-12 (2004) (discussing
nonrandom sampling techniques and their limitations).
8 See J. Scott Armstrong & Terry S. Overton, Esti-
matingNonresponse Bias in MailSurveys, 14J. MARKET-
ING RES. 396 (1977).
9 For example, the authors discuss the need to have a
group ofjudges with backgrounds in civil law, common
law, and Islamic law.
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actually the best gauges of "merit" for an interna-
tional judge? Certainly much of the ICJ's advisory
role benefits from precisely the type of nonjudicial
experience that seasoned diplomats and national
politicians bring to the bench.
Is the judge selection process a central interna-
tional legal problem for governments? For major
states, trust that a judicial candidate will reflect
and protect the interests of the state seems to con-
tinue to be the key factor in selection. For other
states, considerations apart from legal qualifica-
tions may get priority. As for the ICJ, the bicam-
eral election procedure established by Elihu Root
and Lord Phillimore for the Permanent Court of
International Justice effectively ensures that the
candidate of each permanent member of the Secu-
rity Council will be elected. Can one imagine a
government, having installed an international
procedure that assures a place on the ICJ for one of
its nationals, nominating someone who is not tried
and trusted but who is confirmed by the authors as
an appropriately certified international legal
scholar?
Legal regimes are tools that are designed and
maintained by political actors to serve their pur-
poses. It would appear that the government offi-
cials who designed the judicial selection system are
less concerned about the issues that trouble the
authors and prefer a system over which they have
more control. Ifso, the process here simply reflects
certain unyielding realities of contemporary inter-
national politics. In that respect, the index instability
of which Lasswell and Kaplan spoke may indicate
that there are reasons for selecting international
judges differently than selecting domestic judges.
W. MICHAEL REISMAN &
RAMANUJAN NADADUR
Yale Law School
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In the summer of 1998, 165 countries and at
least 250 nongovernmental organizations con-
vened in Rome to negotiate a treaty to establish a
permanent international criminal court. Against
all odds, they did so, and the Statute for the Inter-
national Criminal Court' (Rome Statute) was
adopted.2 Less than four years later, that treaty had
acquired the necessary 60 ratifications to enter
into force, and the International Criminal Court
(ICC) could begin its work. As of this writing, this
fledgling international institution has 121 states
parties and is addressing crimes committed in 7
countries, with the prosecutor closely following
situations in 8 others. The ICC has faced many
major challenges in its early years, including pun-
ishment from the United States, anger from many
African leaders, and indifference from many of
those that it counted as supporters. Yet at the most
recent meeting of the ICC's Assembly of States
Parties in New York, at which it elected the second
chief prosecutor and six new judges in December
2011, one could be cautiously optimistic that this
new and controversial institution is becoming part
of the international landscape, slowly finding its
footing in a difficult world and gaining the respect
of the constituencies that it was created to serve.
Such, at least, is the thesis of The International
Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Stat-
ute, the latest book on the ICC written by William
Schabas, and it is one with which this reviewer
agrees. Examining a work of this magnitude is
both an honor and a challenge. Schabas's extraor-
dinary treatise on the ICC is a 1210-page tome
that takes some time to peruse. It represents an
exceptional compendium of his experiences over
the years, not only as a delegate to the Rome Con-
ference but also as an observer and participant in
the system of international criminal justice that
has evolved since the 1990s, as a professor of inter-
national law at Middlesex University, and as the
director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights at
the National University of Ireland, Galway. At the
same time, the opportunity to plunge into such
a detailed work is nearly irresistible given the
author's stature as one of the world's preeminent
scholars of international criminal law and human
' Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90..
2 Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New
International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88
GEO. L.J. 381, 383-84 (2000).
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